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The purpose of this article is to further our understanding of the 
transformation of Muslim consumption and anti-consumption by an 
empirical case study of Malaysia. Much current anti-consumerist and 
anti-globalization discourse identifies boycotting as an immensely 
powerful force. I argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the 
micro-social logics of modern forms of religious consumption and anti-
consumption in particular historical/national settings and that these 
issues should be explored in the interfaces between Islam, state and 
market. This article examines the political and cultural effects of the 
Islamic opposition’s call to boycott US goods in Malaysia in the wake 
of 9/11 that coincided with a forceful stress on promoting modern halal 
(in Arabic halal literally means ‘permissible or ‘lawful’) products and 
services. This article argues that from around that time, Muslim 
consumption in Malaysia became the subject of increasing consumer 
activism and I explore how Malaysian federal state institutions, Islamic 
organizations and consumers respond to and are affected by calls to 
boycott (anti-consumption) and boycott (consumption) a range of 
products. More specifically, this article examines the above issues 
building on ethnography from fieldwork with Muslim Consumers 
Association of Malaysia (PPIM), which is an organization that protects 
the interests of Muslim consumers and entrepreneurs, as well as Malay 
Muslim middle-class informants. 
 
 
I am in the Al-Mujahideen mosque situated between the modern and 
relatively affluent middle-class suburb of Taman Tun Dr Ismail (TTDI) half 
an hour’s drive from the capital of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, and the gigantic 
One Utama mall that also houses an IKEA outlet. This mosque is largely 
influenced by the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), the Islamic opposition 
party enjoying widespread popularity. It is October 2001, merely one month 
after the 9/11 bombings in the US. In the mosque, I am looking at an 
announcement that encourages boycotting American goods because of the 
war in Afghanistan and American support for the Israeli oppression of the 
Palestinians. The text under the picture reads: ‘Every Malaysian Ringgit (the 
currency in Malaysia) spent on American products means another dead 
Palestinian.’ 
In TTDI itself, the site of my fieldwork, there is another mosque, the 
At-Taqwa, which is the main mosque chosen by the majority of my Malay 
Muslim middle-class informants, and more generally Malays in TTDI. The 
At-Taqwa, in contrast to the Al-Mujahideen, is ideologically as well as 
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financially dependent on state sponsorship and the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO), the dominant political party in Malaysia since 
independence from Britain in 1957. Immediately after PAS’s encouragement 
to boycott, Persatuan Ulama (literally, ‘those who know the law’) Malaysia 
(PUM) or in English the Malaysian Ulama Association supported this call in 
the media.
 
The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, 
condemned the PAS/PUM encouragement as being overly emotional. In fact, 
the state not only rejected the boycott, but also staged a media campaign to 
boost national consumption. 
TTDI also borders on the lush greenery of Sungai Pencala that was the 
home of the commune of Darul Arqam. Darul Arqam or the House of Arqam 
is an Islamic group whose believers seek to follow the ascetic behaviour of 
the Prophet Muhammad in everyday life. Darul Arum’s cultivation and 
marketing of an Islamic vision of Malay independence and prosperity 
through the production of a wide range of halal (‘lawful’ or ‘permitted’) 
products was of the greatest interest to Malays in TTDI. Darul Arqam 
successfully promoted this vision of communal self-sufficiency, and their 
halal goods were traded throughout Malaysia. The Malaysian National Fatwa 
(opinion concerning Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar) Council 
banned the organization in 1994 reasoning that the movement and its leader, 
Ustaz (religious teacher) Ashaari, believed in the imminent appearance of the 
Mahdi (or hidden Imam, a Muslim man who leads the prayers in a mosque), 
a key idea in Shia belief that in Malaysian Sunni orthodoxy implies unseen 
power and sectarian secrecy. Simultaneously, the banning of Darul Arqam 
signified the nationalization of the proliferation of halal and concentrated its 
certification in the realm of the state where it has remained (Darul Arqam has 
now dispersed and a highway runs through the area). This article shows how 
organizations such as Muslim Consumers Association of Malaysia (PPIM), 
which is an organization that protects the interests of Muslim consumers and 
entrepreneurs, to a large extent has taken over, continued and 
institutionalized the work of dakwah (literally salvation) groups such as 
Darul Arqam that emerged in the wider resurgence of Islam in Malaysia 
starting in the 1970s. The central research question here concerns the 
Malaysian federal state and Islamic organizations’ understanding of calls to 
boycott/buycott in the context of a global and increasingly regulated market 
for halal products and services and how PPIM and Malay Muslim consumers 
respond to and are affected by these discourses. A buycott is a type of 
positive boycott with a twist where the focus is on what to buy. Typically, a 
buycott will encourage consumers to buy locally manufactured products or 
may work as efforts by consumer activists to induce shoppers to buy 
products or services of selected companies (Friedman 1996: 440). Indeed, 
modern Malay Muslim middle-class identity in Malaysia is unimaginable 
without taking the divergent interpretations and practices of Islamic 
consumption into consideration. The empirical evidence presented in this 
article sheds new light on the way in which actual practices, puritan ideals as 
well as political and religious discourses all infuse the debate over 
boycotting/buycotting. 
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Elsewhere, I have argued that the more cultures of consumption assert 
themselves in Malaysia, the more controversies over what Islam is, or ought 
to be, are intensified. As new consumer practices emerge, they give rise to 
new discursive fields within which the meaning of Islam and Islamic practice 
are debated. One key effect of these transformations is the deepening and 
widening concern for halal commodities among Malay Muslims that I have 
labelled halalization. Halalization signifies a major preoccupation with the 
proliferation of the concept of halal in a multitude of commodified forms. 
Halalization has led to the emergence of new forms of aesthetic Malay 
communities based on different taste preferences in various middle-class 
fractions. This proliferation of halalization has incited a range of elaborate 
ideas of the boundaries and authenticity of halal purity versus haram 
(prohibited) impurity (Fischer 2008). This paper also forms part of a larger 
research project with the title Islam, Standards, and Technoscience: In 
Global Halal Zones (Fischer 2015). The central topic of this book is on ‘the 
bigger institutional picture’ that frames everyday halal consumption, the 
contact zones or interface zones between Islam and markets through 
techniques like production, trade, and standards. Methodologically, this 
paper is based on ethnographic material from fieldwork among federal state 
institutions, Muslim organizations and Malay middle-class groups, namely 
participant observation and interviewing undertaken since 2001.  
This paper is divided into eight sections. Following this introduction, I 
will highlight why the Malaysian national context is of special significance. 
Then I discuss modern and globalized halal before moving on to the issue of 
how this paper contributes to the consumption/buycott and anti-
consumption/boycott literatures. Then Malay Muslim middle-class 
consumption is discussed before entering into the ethnographic portion of the 
paper on PPIM and Malay Muslim middle-class consumers. The conclusion 
ties the findings of the article together and reflects on how Muslim 
consumption/anti-consumption is given new expression in the interfaces 
between Islam, state and market.  
 
 
Consumption and anti-consumption in context 
 
As it happened, global events were to dramatically change the context of 
Malaysia. A few weeks later, the US invaded Afghanistan during Ramadan 
in search of Osama bin Laden, this move was widely condemned in Malaysia 
and the Muslim world as an attack on Islam itself. The Islamic opposition in 
Malaysia encouraged direct military support for the Taliban against the 
Americans, whereas Mahathir claimed direct support was a 
counterproductive over-reaction.  
In much the same way, Mahathir rejected the call to boycott American 
goods, arguing that it was irrational, harmful and even unpatriotic. Directly 
attacking the PAS/PUM boycott, Mahathir then launched his festival season 
call to spend. This call can signify what Friedman (1999: 11) conceptualized 
as a buycott. One has to distinguish between calls for buycotts and actual 
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buycotts, and the real challenge is to map why consumers follow or reject 
calls to buycott. 
Mahathir’s encouragement of the plan to boost national consumption in 
2001 was given further impetus in the context of multicultural Malaysia with 
its celebration of numerous religious festivals of the three main ethnic groups. 
Of the Malaysian population of around 28 million in 2010, about 67 percent 
are indigenous Malays (virtually all Muslims) and tribal groups that together 
are labelled bumiputera (literally, sons of the soil); 25 percent are Chinese; 
and 7 percent are Indians (http://www.statistics.gov.my). Under the caption 
Think Practically, Dr M. Advises Ulamas in The Star 4 December 2001, 
Mahathir attacked PUM for their call to boycott American goods in the wake 
of the US attack on Afghanistan: ‘We should not be emotional, we should 
think practically, things that we can do, we do, things that we cannot, we 
don’t talk about it,’ the Prime Minister told reporters after breaking fast and 
performing terawih prayers, a special prayer performed only at Ramadan.  
In the same article, an anonymous representative from PUM replied that 
‘It’s unfair to ask the government to boycott [American goods], we do it on 
our own, things that we don’t need, we don’t use.’ The representative added 
that the call was difficult to implement and cited American-made Boeing 
aircrafts being used to fly Malaysian pilgrims to the Haj (the pilgrimage to 
Mecca, which is a principal obligation of adult Muslims)
 
as an example.  
This contestation of Islam in the context of boycott and buycott is 
symptomatic of broader controversies over being the true defender of Islam 
in Malaysia. UMNO is accusing PAS of wrong teachings while PAS blames 
UMNO for giving in to Western values and materialism. The state soon 
elaborated its criticism of boycotting further by saying that such a boycott 
would have either no effect or damaging effects on US-Malaysian relations. 
This view was outlined under the caption Goods Boycott Will Only Hurt Us 
(New Straits Times 8 December 2001).1  
The global economic downturn and insecurity following 9/11 
moderated consumer sentiments in Malaysia. Consequently, the state 
launched a campaign in the media (The Star 13 November 2001) aimed at 
boosting the consumption of, especially, domestically produced goods. 
Under the caption ’Tis Season for Spending, Consumers Told, the following 
article encouraged patriotic shopping for the state. As a consumer you are 
advised not to be: ‘stingy about spending for the festive season as this will 
not help to stimulate the economy’, the Trade and Consumer Affairs Ministry 
parliamentary secretary explained. As the country prepared to celebrate 
Deepavali (the Hindu Festival of Light), Hari Raya (celebrated by the 
Muslims (signifies the end of the fasting season of Ramadan), Christmas and 
Chinese New Year, ‘let’s not be too rigid in our expenditure, which could 
lead to over saving’, he argued. 
9/11 had become a global concern reconfiguring domestic politics in 
                                                 
1  New Straits Times and The Star (as we shall see below) are widely 
popular English-language newspapers. 
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Malaysia and consolidated the country’s position as a moderate Islamic state 
(Shamsul 2001: 7). One of the main structuring constraints in the shaping of 
reactions to 9/11 was the political contestation between PAS/PUM and 
UMNO, who clearly understood 9/11 in quite contradictory ways. At the 
same time, 9/11 transformed Islam into both an agent and a product of 
globalization, making Islam a global phenomenon that demands an opinion 





The global halal trade annually amounts to $632 billion and it is rapidly 
growing (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2011). The Koran and the 
Sunna (the life, actions and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad) exhort 
Muslims to eat the good and lawful that God has provided for them, but there 
are a number of conditions and prohibitions. Muslims are expressly 
forbidden to consume carrion, spurting blood, pork, or foods that have been 
consecrated to any being other than God himself. These substances are haram 
and thus forbidden. Ritual slaughtering entails that the animal be killed in 
God’s name by making a fatal incision across the throat. Another significant 
Islamic prohibition relates to wine and any other intoxicating drink or 
substance (Denny 2006: 279).  
In the modern food industry a number of requirements have been made 
in relation to halal food, for example to avoid any substances that may be 
contaminated with porcine residues or alcohol such as gelatine, glycerine, 
emulsifiers, enzymes, flavours and flavourings (Riaz and Chaudry 2004: 22–
25). Moreover, aspects of context and handling are involved in determining 
the halalness of a product. The interpretation of these questionable areas is 
left open to Islamic specialists and state institutions such as JAKIM. In the 
end, however, the underlying principle behind the prohibitions remains 
‘divine order’ (Riaz and Chaudry 2004: 12).  
For some Muslims, halal sensibilities necessitate that halal commodities 
are only produced by Muslims, and that this type of production is kept 
strictly separate from non-halal production. Halal commodities and markets 
are no longer expressions of esoteric forms of production, trade, regulation 
and consumption but part of a huge and expanding globalized market. 
Muslim dietary rules assumed new significance in the twentieth century, as 
some Muslims began striving to demonstrate how such rules conform to 
modern reason and the findings of scientific research. Another common 
theme in the revival and renewal of these dietary rules seems to be the search 
for alternatives to what are seen to be Western values, ideologies, and 
lifestyles. These tendencies took on special importance from 2001 onwards.  
Over the past three decades, the Malaysian state has effectively certified, 
standardized, and bureaucratized halal production, trade and consumption. 
Malaysia is described as a model country in terms of complying with halal 
standards, and the country has strong halal activity in food processing and the 
export/import trade as reflected in its systematization and standardization of 
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halal certification. In response to the expansion of food service 
establishments and the opening of international restaurants in Malaysia from 
the 1970s onward, a thorough enactment of laws, diverse procedures and 
guidelines was worked out.  
The article The Halal Way to Free Trade (New Straits Times May 11, 
2006) asserted that in the years since Sept 11 terror attacks, the halal market 
has grown from a tributary concern of the devout to the mainstream of the 
multitudes. Politics has combined with demographics to manufacture an 
economic demand of global proportions while supply, still highly localised 
and inward looking, struggles to catch up.  
However, it was far from only 9/11 that shaped to Malaysian halal 
sentiments. A major food scandal in Indonesia in 2001 triggered a new phase 
of halal proliferation on a global scale. The Majelis Ulama Indonesia or 
Indonesian Ulemas Council (in English), set up by the Indonesian state in 
1975, accused a Japanese company of using pork products in the production 
of the flavour enhancer monosodium glutamate and demanded that the 
Indonesian government take appropriate action. It was a serious accusation: 
if true, the company would have violated halal rules, which forbid Muslims 
from eating any pork or pork-derived products.  
As a consequence of the scandal, several of the company’s employees 
were arrested, and a public apology was issued. It is most likely that the 
flavour enhancer did not contain any pork products; instead, the company 
admitted to having replaced a beef derivative with the pork derivative 
bactosoytone in the production process, for economic reasons. Bactosoytone 
was used as a medium to cultivate bacteria that produce the enzymes 
necessary to make monosodium glutamate. As the products of the company 
had previously been certified as halal by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, the 
scandal seemed to undermine or question the legitimacy of these religious 
scholars in the eyes of millions of Muslim consumers. The scandal also made 
it clear that even multinational companies can come into conflict with the 
rising number of Muslim consumers and organizations if they overlook or 
disregard religiously inspired customs. To sum up, 9/11 and the food scandal 
in Indonesia had a marked impact on the way in which halal was produced, 
consumed and regulated in Malaysia.  
 
 
Boycott/anti-consumption or boycott/consumption? 
 
I place my analysis of Malay Muslim consumer activism in the interfaces 
between why people choose or reject a product or brand. Even if anti-
consumption research focuses on reasons against consumption rather than 
pro-social movements, I show that the distinction between the two is not 
always easy to maintain in the analysis of everyday decisions of consumers 
(Michael et al. 2009: 145). Exiting scholarship on politically motivated brand 
rejection among Muslim consumers (Sandikci and Ekici 2009) explores this 
as an emergent form of anti-consumption behaviour. Three sets of political 
ideologies can lead to consumer rejection of certain brands, that is, predatory 
74 Journal of Islamic Research, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2015, pp. 68-87 
 
globalization, chauvinistic nationalism and religious fundamentalism and I 
shall discuss how these issues are understood and practiced in the Malaysian 
context. In a broader perspective political consumption relies on market 
actions and consumer choice as political tools (Micheletti 2003; Micheletti et 
al. 2003) that potentially can change existing institutional or market relations.  
Boycotts urge consumers to withdraw selectively from participating in 
the marketplace (Friedman 1999: 5). In Friedman’s taxonomy of boycotts, 
the case of boycotting in Malaysia qualifies as a media-oriented and action-
requested boycott, that is, announcing that the boycott is being called, and 
that appropriate action is necessary (Friedman 1999: 10). The relatively 
limited literature on boycotting in theory and practice falls into two broad 
categories. The first explores boycotting from a macro-historical, geo-
political and political economy perspective with emphasis on economic 
behaviour as a particular form of resistance. An example of such 
conceptualizations of boycotting is Feiler’s (1998) study of the evolution of 
the Arab economic boycott of Israel, the longest-lasting example of 
economic sanctions in the 20th century. 
The second interpretation, mostly emerging within market research and 
cultural studies, examines boycotting from a micro-cultural perspective 
stressing the need to understand boycotting as an expression of distinction, 
taste, individuality, ideology or resistance to globalization seen as cultural 
imperialism. Such studies are Littler’s (2005) work on the possibilities and 
limitations of reflexivity in contemporary anti-consumerism activist 
discourse, and Klein, Smith and Andrew’s (2002) discussion of the mixed 
motivations people have about participating in boycotts. In another article 
(2004) these authors employ a cost-benefit approach to boycotting and list 
four issues (desire to make a difference; the scope for self-enhancement; 
counter-arguments that inhibit boycotting and the cost of the boycotter due to 
restrained consumption) that may determine boycott participation. Lastly, 
Sen, Gürhan-Canli and Morwitz (2001) conclude that the success of a 
boycott is determined, firstly, by consumers’ preference for the boycotted 
product and access to substitutes, and, secondly, to what extent consumers 
are susceptible to normative influence. 
I suggest that our understanding of boycotting theory and practice could 
benefit from further elaboration in a number of respects. Firstly, to my 
knowledge, there exists no anthropological exploration linking the two 
categories of boycotting discussed above. Secondly, in an era where 
globalization and anti-globalization have become everyday catchphrases, a 
study that considers local, national and global effects of boycotting seems to 
be long overdue. Finally, the complex relationship, or tension, between 




Malaysian Middle-class Consumption 
 
Calls to boycott are far from new in Malaysia. In 1981, three months before 
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assuming high office, Mahathir had launched his own call to boycott British 
products in the so-called Buy British Last Policy. This boycott was called due 
to what Mahathir saw as neo-colonial British policies. This policy was 
sustained until 1983 (Leifer 1995: 75). Since this call to boycott in the early 
1980s, Malaysian society has undergone dramatic economic and social 
changes that have recast the national context for the understanding and 
practice of boycotting. 
The Malays constitute the largest and fastest growing section of the 
middle class in Malaysia and are the object of both commercial interests and 
current debates over the shape and meaning of Islam. In the 1970s, the state 
launched the NEP (New Economic Policy) to improve the economic and 
social situation of the Malays vis-à-vis the Chinese in particular. The NEP 
entailed a number of benefits for the Malays and other indigenous groups 
such as increased ownership of production and preferential quotas in the 
educational system. The number and proportion of Malays engaged in the 
modern sector of the economy rose significantly as a product of these 
policies. Ideologically, the overall objective was to produce an educated, 
entrepreneurial and shareholding Malay middle class, which the state elite 
views as a necessary prerequisite for economic, national and social cohesion. 
Starting in the 1970s, a powerful UMNO-driven ethnic state 
nationalism has emerged. This type of state nationalist political culture, 
constantly challenged by competing Islamic discourses, tries to balance 
modern forms of consumption as national virtue and national vice. These 
tensions between religion, state nationalism and consumption are of 
particular significance in the growing Malay middle class. 
Debates over boycotting/boycotting and proper Islamic practice are of 
particular significance in the Malay middle class as it is within this 
intermediate group that the question of what constitutes proper Islamic 
practice or legitimate taste (Bourdieu 1984: 60) is most imperative. In other 
words, Malay middle-class identities are given shape in the interfaces 
between revivalist Islam, consumer culture and the blurred area of everyday 
respectability. On the one hand, consumption has become a national virtue or 
project supported by the state as a practice in line with the coveted identity as 
a New Malay. On the other hand, consumption is being questioned from a 
religious and moral perspective and is associated with the ‘excesses of the 
Malay royalty’ represented by the Malaysian king and the sultans of nine 
peninsular states (Shamsul 1999: 105). Malay middle class groups are also 
driving forces behind Muslim consumer activism in Malaysia, as we shall see 
below. 
According to Mahathir (1995: 1), the New Malay embodies an 
aggressive, entrepreneurial and global ‘we can’ mentality that abandons 
feudalistic values of traditionalism, excess, luxury and privilege. These 
official ideas of a New Malay work ethic were to set new standards for the 
realization of national modernity. In other words, in a developing economy 
such as Malaysia, the emergent middle class has become an almost mythical 
national signifier of mental and material development. 
Economically, Malaysia has sustained rapid development within the 
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past three decades and the meaning of Islam has become evermore contested 
in that period. Even though virtually all Malays are Muslim and speak the 
Malay language, the contestation of Islam produces a range of diverse 
lifestyles. Islam, or more accurately, the social and moral meaning of what is 
properly Islamic, is contested and there are competing attempts to 
incorporate it into both state institutions and a multitude of everyday 
practices.  
A range of competing visions of what Islam is or ought to be — for 
example a number of divergent dakwah (literally salvation) groups emerged 
in the wider resurgence of Islam in Malaysia starting in the 1970s. As 
previously discussed, Darul Arqam was an influential example of dakwah, 
but several other organizations have played significant roles in the 
resurgence (Ackerman and Lee, 1997; Jomo and Cheek, 1992; Nagata, 1984; 
Zainah, 1987). It is by no means clear how this Islamic way of life is put into 
practice, and dakwah devotion has undergone relatively unnoticed processes 
of individualization and domestication. Dakwah is both an ethnic and a 
political phenomenon, which has transformed Malaysia for Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike. 
Islam in Malaysia has both produced and is in itself infused by a 
fascination with the morally proper Islamic way of life. This tendency 
embraces the consumption of specific (halal) goods, which may be seen to 
have a beneficial impact on domains such as family, community and nation. 
An example of this could be to prefer certain locally produced and certified 
halal goods, as we saw in the case of Darul Arqam. Conversely, seeking to 
boycott other types of goods on ideological grounds may be perceived as 
protective of the above domains.  
 
 
Muslim Consumers Association of Malaysia: Between Islam, State and 
Market 
 
I am in the SembangSembang Café2 in the The Mall in central Kuala Lumpur. 
The Mall is comparable to the multitude of other shopping malls in Kuala 
Lumpur, but it also stands out by housing the SembangSembang Café. This 
café is run by Muslim Consumers Association of Malaysia (PPIM), which is 
an organization that protects the interests of Muslim consumers and 
entrepreneurs. Groups such as PPIM are to a large extent comprised of 
middle-class Malays. The Café provides shelf space for PPIM members’ 
(halal) products and PPIM and its café is an essential space for Malay 
Muslim entrepreneurial networking. Activists in PPIM try to articulate calls 
to boycotts and expand halal requirements to cover more and more products 
and processes and lobby for the state to incorporate these requirements into 
halal production, trade, consumption and regulation. An important question 
                                                 
2 In Bahasa Malaysia sembang-sembang means ‘casual conversation’ or 
‘chatting’. 
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here is how these activists work in the interface zones between new forms of 
Islamic revivalism, the ethnicized state and Muslim consumer culture and 
protection. Halal activism has a long history in Malaysia as we have already 
seen and it is a driving force behind the way in which halal has developed 
into a global assemblage, but empirically this is not well understood.  
I am discussing halal with PPIMs Executive Secretary and a friend of 
mine, a Malay woman entrepreneur, Altaf, I have known since 2006. It is 
through this entrepreneur that I have come into contact with PPIM and why I 
am in the SembangSembang Café today. Both Altaf and the PPIM Executive 
Secretary are part of the halal network and the Café plays an important role 
in the way in which this activist and entrepreneurial networking is practiced. 
The networking and activities of PPIM and its members that take place in the 
Café do not directly involve the state, but PPIMs role is essential in order to 
understand the proliferation of halal in Malaysia and beyond: ways in which 
Malay Muslim interest groups network and protect Malay Muslim privileges 
through promoting Muslim products, businesses and halal in particular. In 
other words, groups such as PPIM and its network constantly push for 
increased Muslim consumer protection and privileges. In the eyes of these 
groups, the state is unable or reluctant to deliver enough support for these 
demands. 
The New Economic Policy (NEP) has brought about a marked 
propensity of the bumiputera electorate to lean heavily towards the state for 
solutions to their problems (Gomez 2004: 290). In line with this, Malay 
Muslim consumer groups and activists constantly push for support and 
privileges and the proliferation of halal reinforces this tendency. Islamic 
consumption in Malaysia has been subjected to state and business 
intervention in the form of extensive market research and the political 
institutionalization of consumption, for example the setting up of the 
Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs in 1990. Clearly, this is a 
sign of the state’s bid to protect the entitlements of Malay(sian) consumers 
against what the state and consumers increasingly see as confusing, 
globalized and excessive consumer culture. Consumers’ trust in and 
dependence on the state as an honest broker in consumption legitimates state 
intervention regarding the right ways to shop as well as guidance in terms of 
public debates about value. However, in multiethnic Malaysia the state 
cannot solely promote and protect Malay Muslim consumer interests and this 
is why Muslim consumer organizations such as PPIM and others play a 
major role in safeguarding the rights and privileges of Malays. 
PPIM focuses on business development and social responsibility, but 
also works to assist small and medium sized Muslim enterprises that do not 
have the working capital required to have their products placed on shelves of 
supermarkets and hypermarkets. Moreover, the SembangSembang Café 
provides shelf space for PPIM members’ products free of charge. PPIM also 
consults with members on their goals and ways to actively promote products 
and business. The SembangSembang Café is used as a focal point ‘to 
encourage Muslim Consumers to support Muslim businesses as well as to 
actively promote products which are certified halal.’ Secondly, the café 
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offers ‘a range of business and personal enhancement classes and lectures’ on 
themes such as Strategic Partnerships for women in particular that provide 
the resources for PPIM’s members to secure the finances they require to start 
businesses. An Event Coordinator is responsible for this training and several 
classes consisting of women are to graduate from this program. Thirdly, 
networking and business facilitation are essential for PPIM. The organization 
argues that many people come to the Café to meet friends, potential business 
partners, or ‘those who can nexus business with opportunities!’ 
(http://sembangcafeppim.blogspot.dk/p/aktiviti.html). 
PPIM’s Executive Secretary has been active in calling for boycotts of 
Coca-Cola in 2002 among other similar calls to boycott. The call to boycott 
Coca-Cola post 9/11 under the heading Our program will hurt Coca-Cola 
was a protest against American interference in Muslim affairs. PPIMs 
Executive Secretary said that ‘The boycott is in response to Western 
interference in the internal affairs of Muslim countries in the guise of 
fighting terrorism’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2542517.stm). In 
spite of these calls to boycott Coca-Cola and similar products, Coca-Cola is, 
of course, widely available in Malaysia. In Malaysia, Coca-Cola is fully halal 
certified by JAKIM. Coca-Cola’s deals with a plethora of rumours about its 
products on its Malaysian website (www.coke.com.my) for example denying 
constant rumours that its beverages contain alcohol and ‘ingredients 
extracted from the stomachs of pigs. … All our soft drinks are non-alcoholic 
and they don’t contain any ingredients from mammals and poultry.’ As early 
as 1998, PPIM pushed for a halal standard because the organization was 
concerned with religious principles in management practices. It was timely 
for such a standard to be developed, the Executive Secretary explains, as 
Muslims worldwide had been dependent on standards set by the West, which 
might not necessarily comply with Islamic teachings. When I met with 
PPIMs Executive Secretary in the SembangSembang Café in the The Mall in 
central Kuala Lumpur we discussed many of the above issues. As we have 
seen, the Café provides shelf space for PPIM members’ (halal) products and 
PPIM and its café is an essential space for Malay Muslim entrepreneurial 
networking.  
PPIM’s Executive Secretary called on authorities to conduct scientific 
tests on the food seasoning products from the Japanese company Ajinomoto 
discussed above to confirm products were actually halal. The Executive 
Secretary said claims made by the company and JAKIM that the products did 
not contain pig enzymes were not enough and called on The Domestic Trade 
and Consumer Affairs Ministry to conduct tests and make the findings public 
to instil confidence among consumers (New Straits Times 9 January 2001). A 
couple of days later Ajinomoto Malaysia reassured Muslim consumers that 
its products were halal responding to the call from PPIM (New Straits Times 
11 January 2001). After having carried out tests on Ajinomoto flavouring 
powder JAKIM confirmed that it was halal (New Straits Times 12 April 
2001). Thus, the food scandal in Indonesia in 2001 triggered a new phase of 
halal proliferation and regulation.  
In May 2010 I discussed halal with Altaf and PPIMs Executive 
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Secretary in the SembangSembang Café. Altaf explained to me that even if 
she was not very strict about halal in her personal life, halal was extremely 
important in contemporary Malaysia with respect to the state and companies 
and also in the eyes of consumer groups such as PPIM and this was the 
reason we were here today. Two issues were central in ours discussions: the 
need for and expectations to tightened halal laws and the way in which halal 
is inseparable from Malay rights and privileges in Malaysia. 
The Executive Secretary explains to me that he has been involved in the 
Muslim consumer movement for over 30 years. Similar to what we saw 
above in the case of boycotting, PPIM encouraged JAKIM to ‘withdraw’ 
halal logos of Coca-Cola, Starbucks, and Colgate ‘because of support of the 
Zionist government, illegal money, oppression, but JAKIM will not do it.’ 
This is an example of the way in which PPIM in the interface zones between 
Islam and regulation evokes halal to pressure the government to 
acknowledge that halal is also premised on global questions such as the 
oppression of Muslims. These points are symptomatic of the ‘bigger picture’ 
these activist groups promote against a more reluctant and pragmatic state 
that considers diplomatic relations and ‘moderate Islam’ essential.  
The Executive Secretary argues that the reason to form PPIM in the first 
place was to establish a platform for addressing ‘unfair treatment’ of 
Muslims and their culture. PPIM has supported a ‘clear direction’ in 
Malaysian halal for many years both with the government and with ‘Muslim 
consumers uncritically feeding the system’. An important PPIM critique of 
the state in Malaysia is that this is not sufficiently involved in acknowledging 
and supporting Muslim consumption and halal. Hence, because of lack of 
state support, Muslims are still ‘backward’ in terms of entrepreneurial 
possibilities – in the eyes of PPIM it is unsatisfactory that so little of halal 
production, trade and regulation on a global scale and in Malaysia is in 
‘Muslim hands’ and PPIMs work aims at addressing exactly this aspect. 
However, the last 500 years of Western and colonial oppression has instilled 
a kind of inferiority in many Muslims and this is not easily changed.  
The main objective is no longer to provide proper halal food to Muslims, 
this objective has to a large extent been met in Malaysia, but to make 
Muslims see that halal is an ‘asset’ similar to kosher that should be on 
Muslim hands. PPIM works ‘actively and proactively’ towards these aims, 
for instance by setting up the SembangSembang Café in which all products 
and activities contribute towards this aim. Ideally, 90 per cent of employees 
in the halal industry should be Muslim. Right now, big companies operating 
in Malaysia often would not even let their Muslim employees go to Friday 
prayer. 
The SembangSembang Café is not directly financially supported by the 
Malaysian state, but through Muslim companies and individual members’ 
support. Conversely, the products displayed support Muslims and Muslim 
interests in Malaysia, the Executive Secretary explained. I have shown halal 
activists or organizations promote boycotting of certain products while 
encouraging buycotting halal on a big scale in the interface zones between 
new forms of Islamic revivalism, the ethnicized state, and Muslim consumer 
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culture and protection. Halal activism in Malaysia can be seen as a 
continuation of dakwah engagement, but with a particular focus on proper 
Islamic consumption and halal and not so much Islamic theology. 
 
 
Consumption and anti-consumption as purism 
 
I suggest that the constitution of distinctions between two Malay middle-
class groups is a highly uneven process full of ambiguities and contradictions. 
What is appearing, then, are two Malay registers of modern lifestyles. Firstly, 
one group performs boycotting/buycotting and halal consumption as a 
localized form of purism. Secondly, another group of middle-class Malays 
are more orientated towards a pragmatic approach to these contested 
questions. A couple of informants in each of these groups is now selected to 
represent diverse understandings and practices of the boycott/buycott and 
halal consumption. In other words, these informants are exemplars of a scale 
of strategies involved in proper Muslim consumption. 
Yasir is a 37-year-old man working with IT development and a leading 
member of a local Islamic organization. He lives with his wife and young son 
in a condominium bordering on Sungai Pencala and the Darul Arqam 
commune. The family moved into their flat in 1995. When laying out his 
arguments for supporting the boycott, he elaborates on the Jewish-US 
conspiracy theory mentioned above. Regarding the war in Afghanistan, he 
argues that PUM’s and PAS’s motivation to boycott was incited due to 
American companies’ support of their government, which ‘uses money to 
buy ammunition to fight the Afghans. Most of the top profitable companies 
in America are Jewish owned. US companies are using profits to fight 
Muslims.’ The logic here is that through buying American products, Muslim 
consumers are unwittingly funding the war in Afghanistan. 
Another reason for boycotting, Yasir explains, is the use of child labour 
in India and Indonesia by US companies such as Nike. A boycott would 
ideally bend this dark side of US-dominated capitalism and globalization 
signified by commodities. This type of critique is by no means limited to 
Islamic activism. Naomi Klein (1999: 365) believes that boycotts are the 
most effective force for corporate reform ever seen. In Islamic as well as 
anti-globalization discourse, boycotting a specific product or brand promises 
to confront much larger geo-political conflicts and ethical dilemmas. 
Yasir is surprisingly positive about the question of state encouragement 
to spend: ‘Islam says if you can afford it, by all means spend, but moderation 
is best.’ Again, as in the case of other informants in this register, the question 
of balance and moderation is the primary ideological logic behind this 
statement. In spite of Yasir’s idealization of moderation and balance, he 
seems to endorse Mahathir’s boycott policy in principle. This is a mental 
strategy that tries to create a moral distinction between personal and pious 
religious standards and what he sees as the pragmatics of the powerful state 
nationalist insistence on patriotic consumption in a globalized world. 
Among these Malays, performing public morality is inseparable from 
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the desire to control and purify the body in terms of appropriate attire such as 
the kopiah (skullcap) and a janggut (beard) for men and tudung (headscarf) 
for women. The particular understanding and practice of Islam within this 
group provide these Malays with a rather detailed and shared material 
blueprint for performing a particular lifestyle. Interestingly, the interior of 
these homes did not reflect any uniquely Islamic taste or style. In this respect, 
the homes of this group of middle-class Malays are comparable to the homes 
of the more pragmatic group discussed below. 
Yasir most strongly embodied the power and purism of halalization 
involved in consumer preferences in everyday life. He minutely divided 
Malays into segments according to their adherence to extremely elaborate 
ideas about what was considered Islamically acceptable and what was not. 
These distinctions produced and maintained a polarity between purity and 
impurity and, in the end, legitimate Islamic taste. Once, while in Australia, he 
accidentally ate food that was not halal certified and instantly stopped eating 
it. He explained that while his family was very cautious, many Muslims were 
quite indifferent to these requirements. Yasir drew attention to the different 
groups of Malays and their dedication to halal requirements, which he saw as 
quite incomplete and unacceptable. Yasir‘s ideas about the kind of 
particularity involved in Malay halal food preferences were elaborate, and 
simultaneously worked as one of the clearest examples of ethnic and 
religious distinctions and social boundaries. He identified three main Malay 
segments in relation to halal: 
 
“My friends go for halal food. They will only eat if they see the halal 
logo certified by the government and that the cook is Muslim. Top of 
the pyramid. Very concerned. And down the pyramid you have people 
who as long as they see halal, certified by government, it doesn‘t matter 
if they don‘t see the cook whether he is Chinese or not, they still go and 
eat. Then the lower part of the pyramid. They don‘t care whether it‘s 
halal certified or not. As long as there‘s a word in Romanized halal, 
they go and eat even though they see that there are no Malays, it‘s not a 
Malay business”. 
 
He maintained that his favourite shop was the small Malay-owned Azlinah 
right next to the condominium where he lives. Going to this local shop was 
also in accordance with his principle of buying a minimum of ten per cent of 
the family‘s goods in bumiputera shops. He also shopped at Pasar Raya, a 
local mini market in TTDI owned by Malays, because they had a good range 
of things at a fair price, and to support Muslim businesses. Nevertheless, the 
family would regularly go to Jaya Jusco in the One Utama mall to buy fresh 
food that they could not buy in the small shop even though a Chinese 
company presumably owned this store. 
More puristic Malays attribute their concern about halal (and the lack of 
it in others) to the relatively strict Shafi’i school of jurisprudence within the 
Sunni division of Islam dominant in Malaysia. A young woman in her 
twenties, Maslina, who studies international marketing explained to me that 
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‘I would always say that Malaysian Muslims are stricter. It is just the way 
that we were taught, I think. We are Shafi’i school of thought, we are the 
strictest.’  
In sum, puristic middle-class Malays are acutely aware of their ethical 
responsibility to boycott. But in practice, the ideals of boycotting are blurred 
by a number of social and pragmatic concerns. Purist Malays work hard to 
stretch food halalization to involve proper preferences, taste, handling, 
presentation and context. The halalness of a product is not directly verifiable 
through smell or appearance so it is mainly a question of trust in its 
certification. For the most dedicated among the purists, halal requirements 
are by no means fixed or stable, but instead elastic and expansive. For these 
Malays, halal products must also be produced by (Malay) Muslims in order 
to be Islamically acceptable in the wave of halalization. The above 
discussion shows that boycotting/buycotting and halal are expressions of 
everyday negotiations between consumption and anti-consumption. 
 
 
Consumption and anti-consumption as pragmatism 
 
The more pragmatically inclined Malays often feel intimidated by what they 
see as an unbearable moralism among more puristically orientated Malays. 
This section explores ‘ordinary Malays’, that is, Malays who are not in the 
forefront of contemporary religious or political developments and who are 
somewhat ambivalent about these (Peletz 1997: 231). 
Siti is in her 40s, married with one adult son, who is studying in 
Australia, and she has lived in this condominium flat since 1992. Her 
husband holds a senior position in a bank. She is educated as a teacher. The 
fact that Malaysia is dependent on US industries and investment makes 
boycotting hazardous. In much the same way, this type of pragmatics is 
reflected in the way she articulates why she cannot follow the encouragement 
to shop: ‘I simply don’t have the money to follow that. Some people may.’ 
This type of statement would not have cropped up among the first group of 
informants as it supports unconditional shopping for the state without any 
articulation of Islamic moderation or qualification. 
Siti felt that the whole idea about Islam in consumption, for example 
Islamic banking, was insufficiently argued and altogether unconvincing. 
Islam as an everyday guide to consumption was to her a question of 
partaking of halal food and donning clothes that would cover the body in an 
acceptable yet fashionable manner. In the eyes of more pragmatically 
inclined informants the question of halal preferences was presupposed but 
not carefully elaborated to the extent that will become evident shortly. 
Other pragmatic middle-class Malays explained that the call to boycott 
increased their awareness of, and motivation to, boycott: boycotting was the 
only existing ‘weapon’ to fight America. Turning to the question of 
encouragement to spend, many of these informants were positive towards the 
idea, whereas the family unit presents itself as the limitation to excessive 
spending, that is, a wish to have a ‘limit’ for families to avoid US 
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materialism that undermines social and moral values of families. This is the 
dark side of development Islam can help avoid. At the same time, informants 
would explain that the buycott invites and legitimises excessive consumption. 
Most of the pragmatic informants would agree that boycotting is one way of 
expressing dislike towards the ‘regime’. They felt that the primary drive 
behind boycotting was the impact of American consumer culture in Malaysia: 
yuppies in Malaysia that had received their education in the US or the West 
and brought back this culture, which is then exploited by entrepreneurial 
business people. While this type of critique of global capitalism can be said 
to be pervasive in the majority of economically developed urban settings, it 
seems to take on specific significance as groups of Muslims post-9/11 try to 
purify and balance what they see as material enjoyment that constructs 
superficial and hedonic identities. 
Pragmatic Malays either reluctantly accept the imposition of 
halalization or simply reject it as a material and thus shallow display of belief 
– as Islamic materialism or excess. An expression of this type of resistance is 
Siti‘s phrase that ‘Islamic belief alone should be fine.’ Malays who are less 
concerned with the religious morality of public excess, often feel personally 
victimized by (state) materialism, consumer culture and brands when accused 
of un-Islamic consumption by puristic Malays. In this battle for purity as 
legitimate taste, pragmatic Malays play the part of a ‘supporting cast’ in the 
performance of individualised consumption. Against what is seen as a purist 
taste hegemony, pragmatic Malays evoke authenticity as that which is 
inseparable from individual and sovereign choices and preferences. In the 
end, these choices are seen to produce Malay middle-class identities that are 





My discussion illustrates how actual practices, puritan ideals as well as 
political and religious discourses all infuse the debate over the calls to 
boycott/buycott as a wide range of pragmatics, predicaments, contradictions 
and dilemmas work themselves out in the individual cases. State nationalism 
has effectively resignified boycotting from being a political weapon of the 
weak to becoming a subversive and extremist Islamist bid, while festivals of 
consumption are staged as ‘religious’ in order to legitimate consumption that 
could otherwise be deemed ‘excessive’ by the Islamic opposition. 
In political struggles over the values of public consumption, the rising 
Malay middle class is split between working out what is proper Islamic 
practice in everyday life and at the same time performing patriotic 
consumption. The two Malay groups each manifest one side of the religious 
and pragmatic dilemmas that arise from everyday performances of 
consumption. At the same time, both groups of middle-class Malays are well 
aware that the debates between UMNO and PAS/PUM/PPIM in 
contemporary Malaysia is merely the discursive staging of pragmatic power 
games rather than deeper theological or ideological differences. Although 
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political parties and religious groups claim authority to support what they see 
as their ideal models of proper moral action, middle-class Malays often 
regard these claims and stagings as merely pragmatic, strategic and 
unconvincing rhetoric. The unintended consequence of this battle for the 
moral and religious high ground of public consumption may thus very well 
be to accelerate the process of contestation, domestication and 
individualization that Islam is currently undergoing in Malaysia. 
I have shown that Malay activists or organizations promote halal on a 
big scale in the interface zones between new forms of Islamic revivalism, the 
ethnicized state and Muslim consumer culture and protection. Even if the 
state in Malaysia has preempted earlier and competing forms of dakwah 
organizations such as PPIM play important roles in pushing and protecting 
halal in Malaysia, that is, halal activists constantly call on the ethnicized state 
to tighten halal regulation and call for boycotting products that are associated 
with unwanted foreign influences. 
Even though the more puristically orientated Malays are concerned 
about excessive and un-Islamic consumption, they tend to articulate a 
cautious recognition of the necessity of the state nationalist buycott in the 
post-9/11 context. In order to overcome this ambiguity, puristic Malays try to 
distinguish between national pragmatic concerns and patriotic shopping for 
the state on the one hand and their personal puritan ideals on the other hand. 
Thus, in the interface between the calls to boycott/buycott both patriotic and 
religious identities are constantly cast and recast. 
This type of performed purism, however, sits uneasily with another 
range of everyday concerns over how to translate the Islamic opposition’s 
call to boycott into actual family practices. Hence, puritan ideals are 
challenged, confused and tempered by the quest for material status, by the 
moral obligation to share within families, by media exhortation to consume, 
by nationalist reverence for the Malaysian state as well as by geo-political 
considerations. Consequently, these purist middle-class Malays straddle the 
moral territory between pious and puritan ideals and a national patriotism 
linked to shopping for the state. Paradoxically, my analysis shows that the 
more consumers are exposed to extensive calls to boycott, the more they are 
confronted with the problem of how to translate intentionality into actual 
practice. 
Informants reflected a general adherence to halal principles in terms of 
food. All informants conveyed that this was the single most significant 
principle. Purity in the form of halalization is not a fixed symbol or a 
complete process, but rather something lived and dynamic in the everyday 
lives of puristic Malays in particular. Consequently, the realm of halalization 
must constantly be expanded and elaborated by consumers, capitalists and 
the state in order to retain its impetus and it is these tendencies more 
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